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A Child’s Life or a “Little Bit of Torture”?
State-Sanctioned Violence and Dignity
DORIS SCHROEDER
Dignity consists not in possessing honors, but in the
consciousness that we deserve them.
Aristotle
The Case
On September 28, 2002, 11-year-old
Jakob von Metzler, a banker’s son, was
abducted on the way to his parents’
house in Frankfurt. A sum of one
million Euro was demanded for his
release. Three days after Jakob’s dis-
appearance, Magnus Gäfgen, a 32-year-
old law student, collected the ransom
from the arranged tram stop in Frank-
furt during the night. While under
observation by the police, he ordered
a new Mercedes and booked a holiday
abroad. Seventy-six hours after Jakob’s
disappearance, the police arrested
Gäfgen and his 16-year-old girlfriend
while simultaneously searching his flat.
There they found the missing ransom,
but no sign of Jakob.
Upon arrival at the central police sta-
tion, Gäfgen had (or feigned) a break-
down, which delayed the interview.
Later, being confronted with evidence,
he changed his story several times from
having found the ransom by chance to
being involved in the kidnapping as the
money courier. Accusations he made
naming others were followed up, but
none proved viable. Meanwhile, the
public had been informed and a 1,000-
man search team had been sent to a
nearby wood. None of these activities
yielded any results. As a last resort,
Jakob’s mother was brought to the
interview room, but Gäfgen showed
no reaction. “And we knew,” said one
police officer, “that Jakob might be lying
in a hole in the ground, dying a slow
death.” 1 At 5:30 the next morning, Wolf-
gang Daschner, the police president, or-
dered his men to threaten Gäfgen with
violence to force a statement. Under
duress, Gäfgen confessed immediately
that Jakob was most probably dead
and could be found in a lake near
Schlüchtern. As a result, the police dis-
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covered a child’s body, and death from
suffocation or drowning was estab-
lished. In July 2003, the kidnapper was
found guilty of abduction and murder
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The prohibition against duress or co-
ercion is enshrined in German law based
on the inviolable dignity of human be-
ings. In February 2003, police presi-
dent Gaschner was charged with duress,
and in December 2004, a law court ruled
that Gaschner acted unlawfully. He was
found guilty, and although he could
have faced five years of imprisonment,
no sentence was imposed.
The case sparked a public debate of
unexpected proportions. Although the
treatment of prisoners in Guantánamo
Bay and Abu Ghraib was considered
an abhorrent and barbaric act of vio-
lating human rights and human dig-
nity, the threat of violence in the case
of Magnus Gäfgen was supported by
considerable parts of the population.
Well-known personalities in politics and
the law supported police president
Gaschner’s actions, as the following
two examples show.
According to Oskar Lafontaine, Ex-
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s most fer-
vent left-wing challenger, Gaschner
obeyed elementary moral principles,
as one cannot allow an innocent child
to die in agony because of formal, con-
stitutional articles. (As already indi-
cated, the whereabouts and fate of
Jakob von Metzler were unclear at the
time of Gaschner’s decision. It was,
for instance, conceivable that Jakob
might die from dehydration or suf-
focation, depending on his situation,
and given the assumption that the
only kidnapper was in police cus-
tody.) Although torture is prohibited,
situations can arise where rigid deter-
mination to follow the law is unhelp-
ful, said Lafontaine.2 Likewise, but
more unexpectedly, the then chairman
of the German Judges’ Association
(Deutscher Richterbund ), Geert Macken-
roth, defended Gaschner’s decision.
He stated in an interview that torture
or the threat thereof might be allowed
when a higher legal good is to be
preserved. As an example, he recalled
the events of September 11, 2001,3 in-
dicating that torture would have been
acceptable in order to prevent them.
On the other hand, an alliance of
human rights and civil liberties groups
welcomed the decision to charge
Gaschner and insisted that the trial
must be used to reaffirm the strictest
possible prohibition of state-sanctioned
violence. The erosion of legal protec-
tions for citizens and civil liberties must
not be allowed.
Article 1 of the constitution affirms
that the dignity of human beings is in-
violable. Accordingly, the constitutional
court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) spoke of
“torture” rather than “duress” in con-
nection with Gaschner’s case and the
chair insisted that “[h]uman dignity is
inviolable. Nobody must be made into
an object, a bundle of fear.” 4 No human
being must be treated only as a carrier
of knowledge —which the state wants
to access. According to the judges, Gash-
ner lost his head under severe pressure
and violated the principle of human
dignity.
Interestingly, Jan Philipp Reemtsma,
a millionaire’s son and now professor
of German literature at the Univer-
sity of Hamburg, who survived his
own abduction in 1996, came forward
strongly supporting the constitutional
court. In his view, the mere discussion
of torture and duress in police cus-
tody is an attack on civilization.5
This paper is restricted to discus-
sion of a specific German case and the
question of whether police-sanctioned
violence could be justified in similar
cases. However, the tension between
individual liberties as enshrined in
democratic constitutions and the so-
called fight against terrorism will be
obvious in parts.
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Dignity
The ruling by the German constitu-
tional court emphasized the concept
of “dignity” in their judgment, and it
is notable that dignity has made an
increased appearance in national con-
stitutions and ethical guidelines. Die
Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar6
(human dignity is inviolable), starts
the German constitution, and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights
begins with the sentence7
[The] recognition of the inherent dig-
nity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world.
But imagine a dignified person. Whom
do you see? Perhaps Nelson Mandela
who kept his poise and self-respect
during 26 years of imprisonment? Or
Othello, who is said to have greater
inherent nobility and self-control than
any other Shakespearian character? Pos-
sibly Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San
Suu Kyi, who spent 9 of the past 15
years in some form of detention in
Burma without losing her serenity? Or
Antigone, daughter of Oedipus, who
combined heroic courage with gentle
care for father and brother? Whom-
ever you see, it is unlikely that it is a
mass murderer, a cowardly torturer, a
rapist, or a pedophile. In general, one
associates dignity with certain charac-
ter dispositions that prevent evil be-
havior, for instance, rational self-
control, composure, and calmness, but
also the power of self-assertion and
belief in one’s own worth.
Is not dignity a quality that gener-
ates respect and even awe among those
who observe it?8 But if it is, how does
it apply to a convicted child murderer,
as in the above case? The German
constitutional court did not convict
the police president of violating the
suspect’s dignity because of his vir-
tues but because of his inherent worth
and nobility. Hence, there must be dif-
ferent types of dignity, and we shall
look at the main three in reverse order:
1. intrinsic worth and nobility
2. the quality of being worthy of
esteem
3. the honor associated with a high
office or rank.
Honor Associated with High Office
or Rank
Most Western and Northern European
expressions for dignity go back to the
Latin dignitas (dignité, dignità, dignidade,
dignidad, dignity9 ) or the Old German
wirdî (Würde, Waardigheid, Värdighet10 ).
Both are etymologically related to the
term worth, which initially described
the rank, honor, or standing of a per-
son. When one talked about dignity in
premodern times, one referred to strat-
ified societies in which some people
were valued higher than others. The
German word Würdenträger (carrier of
dignity) is a clear indication of such
traditions. Carriers of dignity were in-
vested with secular or religious posi-
tions of high rank and they behaved
dignified if they acted in accordance
with this position. Thus, dignity was
restricted to an infinitesimally small
number of human beings and strongly
associated with a position.
Quality of Being Worthy of Esteem
During the Enlightenment, privileging
autonomous action guided by reason
over faith in authorities shifted the
meaning of dignity from an associa-
tion with rank to a focus on individ-
ual action. The term meritorious dignity
(Leistungswürde11 ) best describes this
concept. Dignity has to be earned, mer-
ited, through individual action; it can-
not be bestowed by rank only. The
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people mentioned at the outset of this
paper merit the term dignified; their
lives exemplify dignified action. But
what exactly characterizes a “digni-
fied being”; when is one deserving of
other people’s esteem due to one’s
dignity?
Dignity could be called the keynote
of all virtues. To illustrate this claim, it
is necessary first to agree on a defini-
tion of virtue. According to Aristotle, a
virtue is a disposition to behave in a cer-
tain way.12 If someone has the virtue
of courage, she has the disposition to
face up to dangers in a manner that is
neither cowardly nor reckless or rash.
When Antigone buried her brother
against her uncle Kreon’s wish, she
was aware that she would probably
die as a result (and not a pleasant
death). But her integrity and love for
her dead brother demanded a certain
action, and having the right character
disposition, a disposition toward cour-
age, allowed her to sacrifice her own
life for her beliefs.
If somebody has the virtue of mag-
nificence, he has a disposition to give
to others in a manner that neither
greedily holds on to resources nor
squanders them unnecessarily. If some-
body has the virtue of temperance, he
has the disposition to resist harmful
temptations arising from desires with-
out leading a passionless, lethargic life
(verhaltene Leidenschaft).
Those who always behave virtu-
ously live life as it ought to be, ac-
cording to Aristotle, and will enjoy
happiness, eudaimonia.13 Could not a
virtuous life be synonymous with a
dignified life? Could dignity not be
another word for having all the vir-
tues, almost a tautology? If the an-
swer to these questions were “yes,”
we would not be able to find a virtue
that is unnecessary for a dignified
being. (Or we would need to find a
characteristic of “being dignified” that
is not a virtue.)
In a brief tour de force, let us look at
the four cardinal virtues, under which
all other virtues can be subsumed, ac-
cording to Aristotle: wisdom, justice,
temperance, and courage.14 It is per-
fectly plausible for somebody to be
courageous, but immodest, conceited,
and self-indulgent (signs of nontem-
perance) or for somebody to be just
and impartial in their judgment but
cowardly and weak when faced with
danger. Hence, the virtues are sepa-
rate characteristics, which can be dis-
played independently from each other,
with one exception. The cardinal vir-
tue of wisdom (seeing the truth through
perfect reason) is considered the mother
of all other virtues. Wisdom is re-
quired to inform justice, temperance,
and courage.15 For instance, the first
and foremost principle of justice is to
treat like cases alike.16 To do so, one
needs empirical knowledge about the
cases, but also wisdom in judging their
similarities and dissimilarities. Or, to
distinguish a courageous from a rash
action one needs to be able to judge
the situation, one’s own powers, and
the difference one can make by acting
in which way. Wisdom is, hence, re-
quired to inform courage. And finally,
wisdom is required to inform self-
discipline or temperance. Somebody
who naturally (perhaps due to illness
or lethargy) refrains from desire-driven
behavior is not virtuous. Only when
wisdom informs an action, in other
words only if one refrains from cer-
tain behaviors because reason contra-
dicts them, can one meaningfully speak
of temperance.
When it comes to dignity, all four
virtues are required. A dignified being
cannot be unwise, unjust, willful, or
cowardly.
Wisdom. A being who does not dis-
play wisdom can be ignorant, foolish,
silly, thoughtless, imprudent, irratio-
nal, or a bad judge of character, to
name just a few possibilities. None of
Health and Human Rights
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these are compatible with dignity.
When Socrates famously said that the
only thing he knows with certainty is
that he knows nothing,17 he did not
display ignorance, but acute aware-
ness of human limitations, another in-
stance of wisdom. Wisdom, the attempt
to always seek the truth and act
through reason, which includes judg-
ment of one’s limitations, seems to
be an integral part of dignity. Other-
wise it would have to be possible to
imagine a silly or imprudent action,
for example, that is compatible with
dignity.
And wisdom has another side to it:
a sense of one’s own worth. A sense of
self-respect is essential to dignity, but
must not lead to brutish noisiness, self-
complacency, self-pity, exhibitionism,
arrogance, and the like. Dignified be-
ings take themselves seriously, but not
too seriously. According to this under-
standing of dignity, servility and self-
deprecation are moral defects. To be
servile means to have an attitude to-
ward one’s rightful place in the com-
munity of human beings that is
inappropriate.18 This error of judg-
ment signifies a failure to understand
one’s rights and a failure of wisdom.
Justice. To be fair- and open-minded,
unbiased, truthful, honorable, and just
seem to be essential characteristics of
dignified beings. Would Antigone enjoy
our respect to the same extent if she
had cheated —for example, if she had
lied to her uncle to avoid death while
surreptitiously burying her brother?
Those who do not show justice in their
actions can be revengeful, prejudiced,
intolerant, opinionated, fanatical, dis-
respectful, and sleazy, to again name
just some possibilities. None of these
are compatible with dignity.
Temperance is probably the cardinal
virtue most strongly associated with
dignity, although one has to bear in
mind that it always combines with
wisdom. Rational self-control is an
integral part of dignity, as are self-
possession, poise, and passions con-
trolled without being negated.19
Tempered beings limit their excesses
and respond appropriately in diffi-
cult situations. Rage, annoyance, bad
moods, gluttony, overindulgence, im-
modesty, greed, hedonism, or in-
satiability are all instances of failed
temperance. On the other hand, a tem-
pered person does not have to be calm
and austere all the time. When faced
with a serious injustice, controlled self-
discipline requires righteous indigna-
tion, which could easily take the form
of anger, but not of malicious revenge.
Again, it becomes clear that temper-
ance is required for dignity, as are
wisdom and justice.
Courage. Cowardice is unfailingly un-
dignified, but so is rashness in the
face of danger. Although the latter
might look heroic at first sight, it can
easily turn out to be careless, irratio-
nal, and foolish —in other words, un-
dignified. An event in Dortmund might
illustrate this point.20 On March 11,
2002, Rolf Fritz dug a 4.5-meter-deep
ditch with machinery, which required
finishing off by hand. When he had
almost completed his work in the ditch,
the walls tumbled in and within min-
utes he was covered in heavy sand.
He immediately developed breathing
difficulties, as only his head emerged
from the sand. A colleague shouted
for help and Paolo Colella (31), who
worked in a nearby pizzeria, rushed
to the accident. He carefully climbed
into the ditch and continued remov-
ing sand with his hands until the fire
services arrived. Together with three
firemen, Colella managed to free Fritz.
This is clearly a case of heroic cour-
age. On the other hand, if Colella had
acted too rashly, the walls would have
collapsed further, burying him to-
gether with Fritz and potentially even
the firemen. Thereby, he would not
only have potentially lost his own life,
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but almost certainly created Fritz’s
death. (Easy to say with hindsight, of
course.)
It was already indicated above that
wisdom is required to display all other
cardinal virtues and this example il-
lustrates the point with regard to cour-
age. Men and women with heroic
dispositions will risk their lives and
welfare for others, without knowing
the outcome; otherwise they would
not need courage. But to achieve a
beneficial result, they often need good
judgment, a judgment that aligns one’s
power with the challenge one faces.
That is why virtue theorists, particu-
larly scholastic thinkers, believed that
wisdom is the core virtue, upon which
all others were dependent.
The characteristics associated with
the cardinal virtues can all be sub-
sumed under dignity. A dignified being
cannot be unwise, unjust, willful, or
cowardly, as we have seen.21 Return-
ing to the term Leistungswürde —dignity
one has to earn through action —we
can emphasize three issues:
1. Dignified action can be described
as virtuous action in the Aristo-
telian sense implying that per-
fectly dignified beings will display
all the virtues including a good
sense of self-worth.
2. Dignity thus understood, cannot
possibly be a characteristic of all
human beings. In fact, it will be a
characteristic of a diminishingly
small number of human beings.
Leistungswürde paints a picture of
human ideals whose standard will
cause almost everybody to fail
daily on several accounts.
3. Dignified beings are led by wis-
dom, the guiding light for all
other virtues, the light of reason.
Bonum hominis est secundum ratio-
nem esse; the good or the virtu-
ous lies in living/being aligned
with reason.
Intrinsic Worth and Nobility
With Kant’s appearance on the Euro-
pean philosophy scene, the concept of
dignity changed a second time during
the Enlightenment. This is not the place
to describe how Kant moved from the
statement that nothing can be consid-
ered good without limitation, except a
good will22 to intrinsic worth and no-
bility. Let us therefore start with Kant’s
belief that the ability to separate good
and bad depends on the human fac-
ulty of reason. Only because human
beings are rational is it possible for
them to be moral, to decide between
right and wrong. And now comes
Kant’s move to human dignity! Every
individual rational being sees him- or
herself as an end in itself, somebody
with life plans and ideas to realize.
Such a being cannot be bought by
others as commercial goods can be
and used for their own purposes.
Human beings have worth, not a price
for which they can be acquired.23 As
Thomas E. Hill Jr. put it, explaining
the Kantian position24 : Human beings
have unconditional and incomparable
worth that unlike prices admits of no
equivalence.
As an unconditional value, dignity does
not depend on the contingent fact that
something is useful, desired or even
liked. By contrast, things with mere
“price”, or conditional value, have a
value that is dependent upon utility
(“market value”) or at least upon in-
dividual sentiments (“fancy value”).
Anything with mere price has a value
that “admits of equivalents” and so is
subject to calculated trade-offs; how-
ever great its value, there can in prin-
ciple be something else that could
compensate for its loss and justify its
sacrifice. Material goods, reputation,
and pleasures as such have mere price,
and so even great amounts of these
things may at times be reasonably sac-
rificed for other things with the same
value. By contrast, dignity is “above
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all price” and so one can never act
contrary to the dignity of someone for
the sake of things with mere price, no
matter how great the price.
Why do human beings have abso-
lute worth, an inner value —in other
words, dignity? Because of their rea-
soning faculties, which enable them to
distinguish moral from immoral ac-
tions. Because every rational human
being is identical in this regard, some-
thing that appears to be subjective to
each one of them, namely that they
are ends in themselves, becomes an
objective principle.25 Every human
being has an absolute worth, intrinsic
dignity, and nobility, and must not be
used as a means only. One human
being must not instrumentalize an-
other human being or, in Kant’s own,
rather more obscure, words:
Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other,
never simply as a means, but always
at the same time as an end.26
This demand is also known as the
second categorical imperative. If we
previously talked about Leistungswürde,
dignity one has to earn, we can now
talk about Mitgiftwürde27 (dowry dig-
nity), dignity one has intrinsically, with-
out ever being able to lose it or give it
up. In this regard, the people we men-
tioned at the beginning of the paper
do not have more dignity than mass
murderers, torturers, rapists, or pedo-
philes. They all have dignity as a mem-
ber of the human species, zôon logon,
animale rationale, the thinking animal.
A Child’s Life or a “Little Bit
of Torture”?
The German constitutional court ap-
plied the third understanding of dig-
nity, the Kantian one, in their ruling
on the police president’s case. As
quoted earlier, their judgment in-
cluded the statement: “Human dig-
nity is inviolable. Nobody must be
made into an object, a bundle of fear.”
No human being must be treated only
as a carrier of knowledge —which the
state wants to access. The convicted
child murderer was neither associated
with high rank or office nor with all
the virtues, as would be required for
the other two senses of dignity.
However, prominent politicians and
judges, as well as a significant part of
the German population, supported the
police president. Did they subscribe to
an understanding of dignity that is
related to the virtues? And if so, could
this be defensible from a moral point
of view? Do only those who lead a
virtuous life have dignity and hence
qualify to have their dignity pro-
tected? Let us look at the kidnapper
first (at the time of the police presi-
dent’s actions, it was not yet clear that
he had already murdered his victim).
A man who kidnaps a child to extract
money from the parents is not virtu-
ous. His actions fail at least on the
accounts of justice and wisdom. Even
if one did not make him responsible
for his deeds by pledging insanity, the
virtue of wisdom and therefore dig-
nity would be lost.
Perhaps lack of virtue could be the
justificatory approach taken by those
who approved of the police president’s
decision. This would lead to the rather
radical claim that only the virtuous
have dignity, which must be pro-
tected. The kidnapper did not have
dignity and therefore the actions of
the police were justified. In this case,
an alignment with moral common sense
might seem plausible. Whereas it seems
morally unacceptable to assume that
only those with high rank or office
deserve protection, some people might
reasonably maintain that one can lose
one’s dignity by immoral action and
thereby one’s right to protection. It is
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not hard to imagine a considerable
number of people, for example, par-
ents of small children, who would en-
dorse “a little bit of torture” 28 to save
a child’s life. For them, one might
assume, the perpetrator lost his dig-
nity by his own deeds and is therefore
responsible for the calamity that be-
falls him later. Let us try to apply this
approach more broadly.
Could the second sense of dignity
yield reliable moral norms, aligned with
moral common sense? If so, the con-
cept could be very valuable when judg-
ing moral dilemmas. Although some
of us might be satisfied with the above
moral verdict, it remains to be shown
whether it could be applied beyond
one individual case. In other words,
would we be happy if state-sanctioned
violence in police custody were —
under certain circumstances — con-
sidered morally justifiable? To answer
this question, we need to consider two
further questions. First, is our conclu-
sion compatible with virtuous behav-
ior? We cannot base the solution for
our moral dilemma on lack of virtue
in the kidnapper and then allow the
same lack of virtue in the behavior of
state officials. Second, can one move
from defending an action in a special
case to the generation of norms for
more general application? Let us deal
with these questions in sequence.
Is Coercion in Our Case Compatible
with Virtuous Behavior?
We worked from the premise that only
those who are virtuous are dignified.
However, this does not mean that one
would be allowed to do whatever one
wanted to those who are not, for in-
stance, coerce them into making a state-
ment. If we base our argument on
virtuousness, we need to ensure that
the actions of state officials are virtuous
too. In the context of state-sanctioned
violence, there are five obvious possi-
bilities for non-virtuousness: (1) crime
against morality, (2) potential inno-
cence of detainee, (3) preemptive ac-
tion, 4) rescue, and (5) alternatives.29
Crime against morality. State violence
behind closed doors is one of the most
detrimental actions to human flourish-
ing and well-being one can imagine
and an insult to justice. One only needs
to mention one harrowing example
to illustrate the point. Stephen Bantu
Biko (1946–1977), a South African
antiapartheid activist, was detained in
September 1977 under antiterrorism
legislation. During his interrogation in
Port Elizabeth, he sustained a head
injury, after which he acted strangely.
“The doctors who examined him
(naked, lying on a mat, and manacled
to a metal grille) initially disregarded
overt signs of neurological injury.” 30
However, after he slipped into a semi-
conscious state, he was transported to
Pretoria (a distance of 1,200 km) lying
naked in the back of a Land Rover. On
September 12, Biko died from brain
damage on the floor of a prison cell,
still naked. In 1997, the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Committee
found that “the death in detention of
Mr Stephen Bantu Biko on 12 Septem-
ber 1977 was a gross human rights
violation [and] the probabilities are
that he died as a result of injuries
sustained during his detention.“31
Biko fought for freedom from op-
pression, and his enormous courage
and sense of justice has to be praised.
However, the police who are likely to
have fatally injured Biko could have
maintained that he was guilty of a
crime. He was a terrorist and enemy
of the state, after all! Hence, the ques-
tion arises for which crimes one loses
one’s dignity and thereby one’s right
to protection. And in addition, one
needs to ask what one can rightfully
do to a human being who has lost or
never had dignity. It becomes clear
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that the mere allegation of a “crime”
is not sufficient to legitimize duress. If
we allow state-sanctioned violence
against those who have lost their dig-
nity, who defines which actions qual-
ify under this heading and which do
not? I return to this problem below
when I ask whether one can move
from defending action in a special case
to the generation of moral norms for
more general application. For now, let
us establish that child kidnapping to
extract money from the parents is prob-
ably one of the few actions that would
be considered a crime, an offence
against morality, on a universal basis.
At the same time, we have to note that
it can be a considerable injustice, which
shows serious lack of wisdom, to de-
fine a crime according to one’s needs,
for example, to keep an oppressive
regime in place.
Potential innocence of detainee. Poten-
tial innocence of detainees is one of
the strongest arguments against du-
ress and other state-sanctioned vio-
lence one can think of. The mere chance
that a small proportion of detainees
could be innocent might call for blan-
ket restrictions on state violence in
police custody. To make the innocent
suffer is one of the most unjust and
therefore nonvirtuous actions possi-
ble. Human knowledge is limited and
errors of justice occur regularly. For
instance, in the United States, 117 pris-
oners on death row had their charges
dismissed in appeal cases between 1973
and 2004. The average time between
being sentenced to death and exoner-
ation was 9 years.32 This shows why
potential innocence is a factor of enor-
mous moral significance. It also leads
to a problem for our case.
The protection of the innocent is
necessary because many cases remain
in the gray area between “clearly
guilty” and “clearly innocent.” Protec-
tion does not have to be given because
we can never know when somebody is
guilty, but because we cannot be cer-
tain at all times. According to the evi-
dence collected by investigating officers,
Gäfgen’s involvement in the kidnap-
ping was established beyond any
doubt. He was apprehended after pick-
ing up the ransom from the specified
location, driving around in an uncoor-
dinated manner to shake off potential
followers, ordering a 70,000 Euro Mer-
cedes car the following day, and book-
ing a holiday abroad. In police custody,
he could not give any explanations for
this behavior and, hence, his culpabil-
ity was as clear as it could be (the
only remaining doubt was whether he
had accomplices). So, for now, let us
establish that with regard to potential
innocence, the Gäfgen case might not
have given rise to concern.
Preemptive action. At first sight, it is
unsurprising that parallels to 9/11 were
drawn. According to the then chair of
the German Judges’ Association, du-
ress in police custody would have been
acceptable to prevent the attack on the
Twin Towers.33 Let us assume that he
had the following in mind when he
compared our case with the terrorist
attacks on September 11. In advance
of the date, we have in our custody
one of the terrorists, a person who
would have flown one of the planes,
or an accomplice with full knowledge
of the details. We only have inade-
quate knowledge of the planned at-
tacks, but we are sure of the detainee’s
involvement and of the attack’s seri-
ousness and imminence. If the de-
tainee is put under duress, we hope
that he will give us full details and
that —as a consequence —we will be
able to avoid an unspeakable tragedy.
The chair of the Judges’ Association
must have assumed that the parallels
in the two cases are striking and that
the threat of violence should be al-
lowed in both. This is not the case! While
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the detainee suspected of planning ter-
rorist attacks is in custody, he is still in-
nocent. He might have planned an attack
on the World Trade Center, but he has
not yet committed it. This is a striking
difference when it comes to the con-
cept of dignity under consideration! In
the latter case, we would be using
state-sanctioned violence on an as-yet-
innocent person. He could still change
his mind about the attacks (or he could
be run over by a bus). The reason we
considered a blanket ban on state-
sanctioned violence in the last section
is because of potentially innocent de-
tainees. When it comes to preemptive
state action, those potentially put under
duress are — by definition — innocent.
And we have already seen that vio-
lence or the threat of violence against
the innocent is unjust. Hence, we have
just identified a third point of moral sig-
nificance in the Gäfgen case. The crime
had already been committed, and on the
day Gäfgen was put under duress he
was already guilty.
Rescue. Our last but one point of
moral significance is probably the most
important one, namely saving the in-
nocent from suffering. Let us assume
the following (which is partly fic-
tional). At the time of his arrest, Gäf-
gen’s 16-year-old girlfriend was also
arrested and questioned by the police
(this is not fictional). Assuming she
had seen the murder of Jakob and
convinced the police she did (this is
fictional), would they have been jus-
tified in putting Gäfgen under du-
ress, for instance, to learn the location
of the body? The evidence for his
involvement in the kidnapping would
still have been overwhelming and the
crime would already have been com-
mitted. But would this have been
enough to justify coercion? I believe
not. The strongest reason for coercing
Gäfgen into making a statement was
the potential rescue of an innocent
child’s life. A just and wise person
would not threaten torture unless a
higher moral command would de-
mand it. One such command could
be to save the innocent victims of a crime
from dying.
By the time Gäfgen was arrested,
almost five days had passed since Ja-
kob’s disappearance. If he had still
been alive in an unknown hiding place
and if Gäfgen was the only kidnapper,
Jakob could be dying miserably from
lack of water, food, or even air. This
meant that additional pressure built
up due to the time constraints. By
putting Gäfgen under duress, the po-
lice were not only threatening a per-
son who lost his dignity, according to
the second sense of the word, by un-
doubtedly committing a serious crime.
They were threatening a person whose
victim might still be rescued from the
results of the crime under investigation.
Alternatives. If we accept with those
who supported the police president
that the rescue of innocent human be-
ings from suffering can —under cer-
tain circumstances —justify the use of
violence, we still need to add one pro-
viso. All alternative means to achieve
the beneficial results intended will have
to have been exhausted. In our case,
the police president saw no further
way to extract information from Gäf-
gen. Upon arrival at the central police
station, he had a breakdown, which
delayed the interview. Being con-
fronted with more and more evidence,
he kept changing his story from hav-
ing found the ransom by chance to
being involved in the kidnapping as
the money courier. Accusations he
made naming others were all checked,
but none proved viable. Meanwhile,
the public had been informed and a
1,000-people search team had been sent
to a nearby wood. None of these ac-
tivities yielded any results. As a last
resort, Jakob’s mother was brought to
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the interview room, but Gäfgen showed
no reaction. One can justifiably agree
with the police president that he had
exhausted all alternative means.
To Conclude on Whether Coercion Is
Principally Compatible with Our Case
The kidnapper has lost his dignity and
thereby his right for protection, accord-
ing to the understanding of dignity
that connects the concept with virtue.
The question, which occupied us for
most of this section, was whether the
police president’s actions were com-
patible with virtue. It would have been
contradictory to assume virtue as the
basis for our understanding of dignity
and then allow nonvirtuous action to-
ward the nondignified. But given the
above, we established that if all of our
conditions were fulfilled, the use of
duress or coercion could be morally
defended. The crime under consider-
ation will have to be universally ac-
cepted as a crime. The guilt of the
detainee has to have been established
beyond any doubt. The crime must
already have taken place. An innocent
victim of the crime can still be rescued
and no nonviolent means to achieve
the same end are available. Virtue is
not synonymous with passive peace-
fulness. Righteous indignation and con-
cern for the innocent might require
nonpeaceful action. Gaschner’s ac-
tions were illegal under German law,
but if one disregards the law as we
did in this section, his action could be
considered moral. Let us see whether
our second question in this section
throws doubt on this preliminary
conclusion.
Can One Move from Defending an Action
in a Special Case to the Generation
of Moral Norms for More
General Application?
Can we formulate morally legitimate
public policies that would allow state-
sanctioned violence in police custody?
Looking at the case in isolation from
the law, we preliminarily concluded
that the kidnapper has lost his dignity
and thereby his right for protection
under clearly defined circumstances
and that the police president’s actions
were compatible with virtuous behav-
ior. Does this mean that coercion in
police custody could be allowed under
the very restrictive circumstances out-
lined above? It is needless to empha-
size that our five conditions will hardly
ever coincide in police and secret ser-
vice work. Particularly, the fact that a
crime has to have been committed
while its victim can still be rescued
applies only to a minute number of
cases, namely, certain kidnappings
and hostage takings. Still, would
those who support the second sense
of dignity favor a public policy allow-
ing state-sanctioned violence under
these circumstances? It is one thing to
sanction —with hindsight —Gaschner’s
actions. But it might be another to use
the second sense of dignity to formu-
late public policies.
Unsurprisingly, there are problems
when moving from the judgment of
an individual case (“What would I
have done had I been Gaschner?”) to
the formulation of public policies.
These problems occur in several areas,
namely (1) the establishment of a
person’s loss of dignity and (2) the
assessment that our five criteria have
been fulfilled, (3) the assurance that
the policy cannot be abused and (4)
the usual suspect, the slippery slope
argument. Let us start with the first
one.
Dignity is only possessed (accord-
ing to the second sense of the word)
by the virtuous. As long as they are
virtuous, they deserve protection, that
is, they must not be put under duress
in police custody. Our public policy
on state-sanctioned violence would
therefore need to define (a) when a
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person loses his or her dignity, (b) how
this loss can be assessed, and (c) who
decides that this loss has taken place.
Loss of dignity? Our definition of
dignified persons required them to be
wise, just, tempered, and courageous.
As a foundation for public policies
involving state-sanctioned violence, this
seems excessive. These criteria might
be suitable for the Vatican when it is
considering sainthoods, but they are
too restrictive to distribute rights of
protection accordingly. It would allow
violence to be used against a wise,
just, and self-disciplined man who
turns out to be a coward or a young,
brave, just, and wise woman who has
no self-discipline. Neither of them
might have done any harm to others.
It seems unintuitive to establish
whether a person is dignified or not
by looking at the presence of all vir-
tues. Instead, it might be more prom-
ising to look for signs of the opposite
and not to restrict oneself to minor
offences. One could, for instance, de-
termine a list of crimes that result in a
loss of dignity. Murder, kidnapping,
hostage taking, rape, and pedophile
attacks could be on the list. But imme-
diately a new question arises: Who is
going to decide which crimes will be
on the list? For instance, some might
argue that pedophile attacks and rape
are not crimes but signs of disease.
Others might argue that murder can
only be added to the list with certain
provisos (e.g., outside the war situa-
tion). Agreement on the list might never
be reached. But let us assume, for the
sake of argument, that we had such a
list. How would we establish whether
a specified individual had committed a
crime from the list or not, without in-
volving a court of law in a very lengthy
procedure? (It is obvious that cases for
state-sanctioned violence of the type rel-
evant to this discussion will need rapid
action.) And, similarly, who would make
such a decision? A single public official
(e.g., a police president?) or a group of
officials? It becomes clear that it would
be impossible to formulate a policy for
state-sanctioned violence based on the
assumption that certain vicious behav-
iors can be comprehensively defined
and reliably detected at short notice.
Satisfaction of the five exemption criteria.
Independent of the perpetrator’s loss of
dignity, we listed five criteria with which
the state official has to comply in order
to remain virtuous with regard to the
case handling. The crime under consid-
eration will have to be universally ac-
cepted as a crime. The guilt of the
detainee has to have been established
beyond any doubt. The crime must al-
ready have taken place. An innocent
victim of the crime can still be res-
cued, and no nonviolent means to
achieve the same end are available.
The first point (the crime under con-
sideration will have to be universally
accepted as a crime) raises a problem
we have already mentioned. Which
crimes would be included on a list of
such serious offences that the perpe-
trators would lose their dignity and
who determines this? Difficult ques-
tion. Likewise, if one wanted to for-
mulate a public policy that allowed
state-sanctioned violence only for the
guilty, one would have to find a quick
and safe way to establish guilt. Al-
though this might be possible on oc-
casions, this will present a major
obstacle for the implementation of the
policy. Provisos three and four are less
difficult to satisfy. The investigating
officers either have the knowledge of
a crime and can make reasonable as-
sumptions about potential victims or
they cannot. And likewise, it might be
possible to judge whether all reason-
able alternative means have been ex-
hausted or not, proviso five.
Even on an optimistic note, this still
leaves us with serious problems. Who
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will define when human beings lose
their dignity? How will this loss of
dignity be established and by whom?
And how would guilt be ascertained?
We can already see that human abili-
ties to agree on moral questions and
human knowledge to establish empir-
ical facts will not be sufficient to pro-
ceed in this manner. But two further
serious issues need to be added: abuse
of such a policy and the slippery slope
such a policy could lead us onto.
Abuse. Policies can be abused, and
those in whom the state invests cer-
tain powers and citizens subsequently
invest their trust can fall very short of
virtuous behavior. Doctors kill pa-
tients34 ; police surgeons rape young
girls,35 police fabricate evidence,36 and
so forth. Can one ever be sure that a
policy that allows state-sanctioned vi-
olence in police custody will not be
abused? No. Hence, if one wants to
protect the innocent, the best way for-
ward seems to be a blanket ban in
line with the Kantian understanding
of dignity.
Slippery slope. And lastly, where could
a policy of state-sanctioned violence
in police custody, restricted to very
specific cases, lead? Gäfgen did con-
fess immediately, without any vio-
lence being carried out. What if he
had not? What if he had suffered in-
juries? What if they had been as se-
vere as in Steve Biko’s case? What if
he had died? Would this still fall under
the same policy? Or would one have
to ask legal experts to devise a list of
duress means that could be acceptable?
To Conclude on Whether One Could
Generate a Policy from Our
Particular Case
Even those who supported the police
president in his actions in one individ-
ual case would probably not want to
move to a general policy on state-
sanctioned violence in police custody.
With the exception of a few very clear-
cut cases (as ours and with the benefit
of hindsight), it is beyond human pow-
ers to establish who has lost his or her
dignity and whether the five exclu-
sion criteria are justified (the crime
under consideration will have to be
universally accepted as a crime; the
guilt of the detainee has to have been
established beyond any doubt; the
crime must already have taken place;
an innocent victim of the crime can
still be rescued; and no nonviolent
means to achieve the same end are
available). In addition, a policy devel-
oped from the Gäfgen/Gaschner case
would be very open to abuse and po-
tentially lead to instances of duress/
torture, which those involved in this
case would not support.
A policy on state-sanctioned vio-
lence in police custody is an attack on
civilization (but the mere discussion
of it is not).
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